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INTRODUCTION
When the Air Force was struggling with the problem of pilots and civilians
dying because of unusual soil and dirt conditions in Afghanistan, it did not know
where to turn to get help quickly. The soil was getting into the routers of its Si-
korsky UH-6o helicopters and obscuring the view of its pilots-what the military
calls a "brown out." Ironically, the policymaker tasked with addressing the prob-
lem in the Department of Defense (DOD) had no way to know that the man
practically sitting across from him had nine years of experience flying these
Blackhawk helicopters in the field. Civil service titles, such as "director" and
"assistant director," reveal little about skills or experience.
In the fall of 2008, the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) piloted Aristotle, a
first-of-its-kind-in-government expert search-and-discovery software platform
aimed at increasing collaboration and expert awareness across the DOD's agen-
cies. Expert discovery, also called "people search" or "expert networking," refers
to software with algorithms that make it easier to sort people based upon criteria
such as reputation, credentials, skills, and experience. There is nothing magical
here. The need to segment an audience is a commonly encountered problem,
especially in online advertising.
Aristotle was a searchable internal directory that algorithmically integrated
people's credentials and experience from existing personnel systems, public da-
tabases, and from users themselves. This made it easy to quickly discover who
knew what and who had done what. Although it was believed to be capable of
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saving the government money over the long term due to its ability to locate and
use in-house expertise, near-term budgetary constraints killed the project in 2013.
Ultimately, the real failure of Aristotle lay not in its demise but in the failure
of government to learn from the experience. The project could have yielded pow-
erful insights about the value of such a system for collaboration and performance
at the Defense Department. At a more granular level, it might have shown
whether searching for and targeting requests to participate in an activity based
on a person's expertise, rather than simply posting an open call for engagement,
does more to improve collaborative problem solving across a bureaucracy.
Aristotle was an attempt to solve a challenge faced by every agency and or-
ganization: quickly locating expertise to solve a problem. Prior to Aristotle, the
DOD had no coordinated mechanism for identifying expertise across its two
hundred thousand employees, which led to a gap in knowing what knowledge
actually existed within the DOD or where to find it. Dr. Alok Das, the Senior
Scientist for Design Innovation who was tasked with implementing the system,
explained simply that "[w]e don't know what we don't know."
This is a common situation. Policymakers often lack clear, cost-effective, and
reliable ways to leverage the full range of expertise potentially available to them-
"the wisdom of the crowd." This reinforces the traditional pattern of the govern-
ment operating behind closed doors with decisionmaking conducted only by
professionals in the relevant department or agency. The problem, of course, is
that these professionals don't have all the answers. Philip Tetlock deepened this
observation in his book Expert Political Judgment, in which he described empiri-
cal research assessing professional political predictions against performance
benchmarks. He found few signs that professionals possess "greater ability to
make either 'well-calibrated' or 'discriminating' forecasts"' than regular citizens
(or a monkey, for that matter).
It is no surprise, therefore, that the use of crowdsourcing is on the rise in
government. Nor is it a surprise that mastery of these open-call techniques is still
a work in progress. The government currently has no systematic way of quickly
getting help from all those with relevant expertise, experience, and passion who,
if asked, would volunteer their time to tackle pressing public challenges. For every
success on Challenge.gov, the federal government's platform where agencies post
open calls to solve problems, there are another dozen open-call projects that
never get seen by those who might have the relevant insights or experiences to
help-even when the calls are accompanied by a prize. Participation through
1. Alton Hoover, Aristotle-A Social Networking Solution Designed and Built for the Air
Force Research Laboratory, 20o8 AEROSPACE & ELECTRONICS CONF. 36,36; see The De-
fense Technical Information Center (DTIC): Aristotle Launched, DEF. THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY (Aug. 6, 2olo), http://www.dtra.mi/News
Multimedia/NewsArticle9.aspx; Open Gov't Initiative, Aristotle, THE WHITE
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/innovations/Dod-Aristotle (last visited
Apr. 18, 2014).
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crowdsourcing is still too ad hoc, infrequent, and unpredictable to provide a re-
liable basis for policymaking.
Prize-backed challenges work best when there is a big enough "haystack" and
an enticing enough monetary purse to coax out the "needle." While social media
and prizes accelerate the opportunity to participate, they are not fast, systematic,
or reliable enough to affect how decisions get made or how problems are solved.
We have not stopped making policy in traditional ways because crowdsourcing,
by itself, relies too much on hit-or-miss serendipity. The high costs of finding the
right expertise means we have to continue to rely solely on professionals for gov-
erning.
Technologies like Aristotle are exciting because they increase the number of
needles policymakers will find by making expertise searchable and discoverable.
This has the potential to lower the costs of finding relevant expertise faster-and
to enable those with expertise to identify the challenges. There is a dual benefit
here: expert networks accelerate the search for innovative solutions to hard prob-
lems and foster greater citizen engagement.
Expert networks can help with finding and attracting more diverse expertise
to tackle problems. It is high time to examine whether it is possible to enhance
the intelligence of public institutions by targeting people on the basis of their
credentials, skills, or experience; by making them more aware of the opportunity
to participate; or by facilitating the process of matching expertise to public prob-
lems. I examine below, in some detail, a new experiment in expert networking at
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The agency is turning to expert net-
working tools akin to Aristotle to find needed expertise within the agency in the
first phase. Subsequently, the approach will be rolled out across the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and among the public to improve the reg-
ulatory review of medical devices. In its first phase, the project will target internal
experts to provide technical advice to regulatory review panels. In the second
phase, the project will move on to recruiting external experts to staff those review
panels. This is an important project because, in this arena, high-quality and di-
verse expertise is desperately needed to protect citizens and accelerate the path of
new devices to market.
Important as the regulatory review problem is, however, and as striking as
this experiment seems, there is something missing. Absent is a comparable level
of attention to using these initiatives as focused experiments to learn how to lo-
cate experts better and with more and more precision. Not enough is reliably
known about which approaches work better in which contexts. If new expert net-
work initiatives do not include experimental research designs from the outset,
the government will never learn enough to scale effectively.
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I. EXPERTNET: A STALLED ATTEMPT AT TARGETING EXPERTISE
In the first (2011)3 and second (2013)4 United States Open Government Na-
tional Action Plans-the written commitments to institutional innovation re-
quired of each country belonging to the global Open Government Partnership-
the Obama Administration implemented the President's promise from his Pres-
idential Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government. This Memo-
randum called for engaging the knowledge, expertise, and perspectives of diverse
members of the public. As President Obama has said, "knowledge is widely dis-
persed in society, and public officials benefit from having access to that dispersed
knowledge" and hence to "collective expertise and wisdom."'
Dubbed the ExpertNet Project,' the White House endeavored to make good
on the President's promise by launching an online discussion via a wiki about the
desired features of new engagement platforms. The White House ExpertNet wiki
specifically solicited input about platforms and processes for targeting and
matching public expertise to opportunities to participate:
The Department of Innovation (the "officials") wants informed, public
input on the department goal of improving the literacy and mathemati-
cal skills of adults seeking advancement. Among the questions they want
to ask are:
* What empirical evidence exists about the relationship between
adult academic performance/career advancement and incen-
tives and the impact of the structure of the incentive-whether
explicit or implicit, predictable or unpredictable, tangible or in-
tangible, etc.-on the outcomes?
* What visualizations help to illustrate the relationship between
academic performance and incentives?
* What are the methods of identifying incentives to which adult
learners will respond, while taking into consideration key causal
criteria that might affect incentive effect (e.g., ethnic and family
wealth differences that might influence attractiveness of differ-
ent incentives) and unwanted side effects?
3. Open Gov't P'ship, National Action Plan for the United States of America, THE
WHITE HOUSE (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/us-national_
action-plan-final_2.pdf.
4. Open Gov't P'ship, Second Open Government National Action Plan for the United
States of America, THE WHITE HOUSE (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/usnational action-plan_6p.pdf.
5. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government from President Barack
Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-Office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment.
6. ExpertNet: Getting Started, EXPERTNET, http://expertnet.wikispaces.com/Getting
+Started (last accessed Apr. 18, 2014).
548
32:545 2014
IF WE ONLY KNEW WHAT WE KNOW
* What specific information should the Department of Innova-
tion collect in order to identify those best suited to invite to test
the program?
* What best practices could be leveraged from the public or pri-
vate sector, and what is the evidence that they work?'
The ExpertNet proposal, which I authored, sought public input about the
platforms, techniques, and processes available for discovering expertise, includ-
ing tools designed to do expertise searching, process refinements needed to use
expertise better, examples of others using expert discovery, and any legal or other
impediments. The ExpertNet conversation attracted advice from forty-two reg-
istered users, including professors from a range of universities from MIT to Mar-
yland, industry experts, and activists. The intention was to learn from that advice
by running pilot projects to test the suggested strategies using different platforms
and seeing what worked.
But the project stalled because of the absence of a senior government official
willing to ask a question and admit to not having all the answers.
11. THE SECOND GENERATION OF EXPERTNET: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE AT
THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
Now, several years later, the FDA is starting to fulfill the promise of Expert-
Net by going beyond hypotheticals to experiment with targeting expertise in prac-
tice. The FDA is accomplishing this goal by using a new and custom-built plat-
form for cataloging and searching experts to identify those who might be in the
best position to offer useful insights.
Among its important responsibilities, the FDA is tasked with reviewing the
efficacy and safety of new medical devices, which include a range of products-
from Band-Aids to heart stents-that reduce suffering, extend lives, treat dis-
eases, and generate enormous economic gain for successful inventors. The Center
for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), a division of the FDA, manages
this complex process of premarket approval and post-market review of all medi-
cal devices. CDRH's Office of Science and Engineering Laboratories (OSEL), its
research hub, employs its own scientists and also consults with outside experts
whose job it is to understand the safety and efficacy of medical devices.
While the pathway to regulatory review and compliance for low-risk items
like tongue depressors is straightforward, more complex, life-sustaining, or high-
risk devices such as pacemakers and breast implants require judicious premarket
approval by those with the right know-how within an appropriate time frame. If
these medical devices reach patients prior to being properly tested, there may well
be very real human costs. Dr. Steven Nissen of the Cleveland Clinic estimates that
faulty devices contributed to more than 2,800 deaths in 2006 alone.' In a CBS
7. Id.
8. Diana M. Zuckerman, Paul Brown & Steven E. Nissen, Medical Device Recalls and
the FDA Approval Process, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1006 (2011).
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report on medical implants, Dr. Nissen noted that "people make the assumption
that when their doctor implants a device, whether it be an artificial joint or a
pacemaker, that it's undergone very rigorous testing. That assumption isn't al-
ways true."9 From breast implants to metal hip replacements, there have been
recalls impacting thousands of people."o Improving pre-market approval does
not address the need for post-market vigilance to identify dangerous and faulty
devices before extensive harm can occur.
III. THE EXPERTISE DEFICITS IN REGULATORY REVIEW
In the current model of pre-market review, several challenges exist, including
a shortage of agility, expertise, diversity, and complexity.
A. Agility Deficit
Premarket review and approval is designed to protect consumers, but it
should also accelerate the path to market for potentially life-saving and lucrative
tools. At present, however, it can take nine months simply to find and convene a
qualified review panel. As the FDA itself explains:
Millions of Americans rely on the FDA to approve life changing drugs
and devices. These innovative medical devices and drugs reduce suffer-
ing, extend lives, and treat previously untreatable conditions to the ben-
efit of our Citizens. The FDA has long been criticized for being too slow
in approving medical innovation. Part of the criticism stems from not
bringing the right expertise into review cycles at the right time. Yet, one
of the biggest challenges is finding the right experts at the right time es-
pecially now that science, technology, software, infrastructure and other
disciplines are colliding. We have a surge of mobile health devices ex-
pected to come into the FDA, more combinatorial products, more large
molecules, nano-delivery systems and many more innovative ap-
proaches that require cross-disciplinary expertise."
Only ioo scientists work at OSEL (8oo total at CDRH), and there is always a
need to get more expertise. The staff at CDRH also has to stay on top of the safety
of devices throughout their lifecycle, which creates further burdens. This partly
9. Elaine Quijano, Report: Medical Implants Rarely Tested, CBS NEWS, Mar. 28, 2012,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505269_162-574o5666/report-medical-implants
-rarely-tested.
10. See, e.g., Greg Farrell & David Voreacos, ]&J Hip Failure Rate as High as 49 Percent,
U.K. Doctors Say, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 9, 2011, http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2011-03-09/j-j-hip-replacement-failure-rate- may-be-49-u-k-ortho
pedists-group-says.html.
11. Jessica Nadine Hernandez, Office of Science and Engineering Laboratories, Food




IF WE ONLY KNEW WHAT WE KNOW
explains why, from 2000 to 2010, the average time to decision on high-risk but
potentially life-saving devices increased by nearly 60 percent (from 96 to 153
days). Over approximately the same time period (2000 to 2009), the number of
submissions for pre-market approval remained the same, hovering just below
10,000 (9>594 in 2000 and 9,655 in 2009). To remedy the deficit, the FDA has
instituted new information-technology decision-support tools. The FDA has also
adopted a policy of giving clearer guidance about the necessary steps, including
key scientific and regulatory requirements, that need to be satisfied within a 120-
day period. But in order to map out a more predictable yet customized regulatory
pathway, the FDA needs more expertise faster, including more internal expertise
to advise regulatory review panels. Budget cuts make it difficult to hire more
knowledgeable regulatory review staff.'3
B. Expertise Deficit
In January 2011, the FDA committed to a plan of action known as the Inno-
vation Pathway to transform its regulatory process and improve how it works
with entrepreneurs both to bring new devices to market and to protect the public.
But to modernize the regulatory review process and help the agency keep up with
the increasing complexity of devices, the agency needs better expertise faster.'4
The Innovation Pathway pinpointed the expertise deficit as a key problem, citing
the need for greater collaboration with a network of experts.5 In fact, CDRH
already uses outside experts for its advisory panels. But panel member-
ship is limited to a pool of Special Government Employees who must be
recruited and enrolled. The Center cannot be assured that an expert in
an emerging technology will be available when that expertise is needed.
Other traditional sources of external expertise, such as public work-
shops, conferences and literature may lag behind current research or
may not be available when a scientific question arises at CDRH. 6
12. Office of Device Evaluation, Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Year 2009, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 4 (2009), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffies/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM
223893.pdf.
13. See Susan Jaffe, FDA Reforms Hampered by Budget Freeze, 380 LANCET 1458, 1458-59
(2012).
14. See Innovation Pathway, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRH
Innovation/InnovationPathway/default.htm (last updated Mar. 10, 2014).
15. See CDRH Network of Experts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/
ucm289534.htm (last updated Mar. 7, 2014).
16. FDA Outlines Plans for an Outside Network of Scientific Experts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press
Announcements/ucm274351.htm. As used here, a Special Government Employee
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This lack of expertise results from: (1) high reviewer and manager turnover
at CDRH (almost double that of FDA's drug and biologics centers); (2) insuffi-
cient training for staff; (3) extremely high ratios of front-line supervisors to em-
ployees; and (4) DRH's rapidly growing workload, caused by the increasing com-
plexity of devices and the number of submissions under review.
In the Innovation Pathway, the FDA originally called for and undertook a
pilot to create a vetted list of experts across two dozen membership organizations
such as the American Academy of Neurology and the Society of Thoracic Sur-
geons." It relied on membership in these professional associations to serve as a
proxy for expertise without any means to "match" people to problems with any
specificity. Although membership in the Society of Thoracic Surgeons might re-
quire that one practice as a thoracic surgeon, the list does not substitute for the
ability to pinpoint expertise better on the basis of experience or even to ask people
what kinds of problems they would like to work on. Above all, the vetted list does
a poor job of reaching those with a great deal of know-how-for example, a Ph.D.
candidate at a university whose dissertation is on a specific medical device, or an
academic or doctor who does not belong to one of these groups.
C. Diversity Deficit
The device-review process demands access to a diversity of expertise. Devices
are very different (think of 3D printed exoskeletons versus heart-rate monitoring
applications). Often, devices are cutting-edge, necessitating new kinds of exper-
tise if they are to be reviewed adequately. As the FDA explains, devices are based
on technologies that "combine many different fields, such as materials science,
electrical engineering, [and] fluid mechanics."'" And because new devices rely on
new kinds of science, they are sometimes hard to describe and are often called by
different names in different fields. This makes it even more challenging to iden-
tify a broad range of expert reviewers.
The agency is also responsible for keeping tabs on device safety from cradle
to grave. It needs to know about a diversity of device types and industries, but
also must be able to measure clinical, economic, and policy impact. This fre-
quently demands different types of know-how. In addition, insight may be help-
ful from people in fields where one would not assume any prior knowledge.
("SGE") is one who works for a term "not to exceed one hundred and thirty days
during any period of three hundred and sixty-five consecutive days." See 18 U.S.C.
§ 202 (2012).
17. See CDRH Network of Experts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/ucm28
9534.htm (last updated Mar. 3, 2014).
18. Jessica Hernandez & Anjali Kataria, FDA Profiles Project Description: Enabling
New Models of Academia-Regulator Interactions: The Feasibility and Outcomes of
Rapid Turnaround Consultation Processes, Science of Science and Innovation Pol-
icy (SciSIP) Grant Application (unpublished manuscript at 2) (on file with author).
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D. Complexity Deficit
As a result of the Innovation Pathway and some other measures, the backlog
began to drop significantly in 2o1o. But the gains are likely to be short-lived. A
study completed by the Boston Consulting Group points to a rise in the number
of drugs and complex devices approved in the European Union long before the
United States. As devices get more complex, the United States is likely to fall fur-
ther behind.2 o Although the FDA does not provide clear data on backlogs or pro-
cessing times, research points to shortcomings within our current system for re-
searching and approving complex devices. This has broad implications for the
quality of care that Americans are receiving. For example, in 2011 the medical-
device company Biosensors International shut down their operations in Califor-
nia due to the time and expense associated with getting FDA approval for a car-
diac stent. The device is available in other countries, including in Mexico and
Canada."
The proliferation of mobile health devices such as heart monitors that lever-
age the sensors in a cellphone has further complicated the regulatory process and
driven the demand for more knowledgeable and effective regulatory review. The
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates mobile devices and the
FDA the medical devices. 22 The complexity of having to clear hurdles in two agen-
cies led these agencies to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding in July
2010, promising to "improve the efficiency of the regulatory processes applicable
to broadband and wireless enabled medical devices." 3 But many feel progress has
been too slow. In April 2012, six congressmen sent both the FDA and FCC a letter
(at the behest of the mobile technology industry) urging the agencies to improve
communication to avoid issuing "slow and inconsistent regulation" which might
19. See Improvements in Device Review: Results of CDRH's Plan of Action for Premarket
Review of Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 12 (2012), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM329702.pdf.
20. See Boston Consulting Group, Competitiveness and Regulation: The FDA and the
Future of America's Biomedical Industry, CAL. HEALTHCARE INST., at iii (2011),
http://www.bcg.com/documents/fle72o6o.pdf.
21. See Andrew Pollack, Medical Treatment, Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/O2/1o/business/iodevice.html.
22. See Fenwick & West Life Scis. Group, The Regulatory Future of mHealth: FCC, FDA,
and the United States Congress, JD SuPRA Bus. ADVISOR (June 19, 2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-regulatory-future-of-mhealth-fcc-f-225
52/.
23. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Communications Commis-
sion and the Food and Drug Administration Center for Devices and Radiological
Health 2 (July 2010), http://www.elsevierbi.com/-/media/Images/Publications/
Archive/The%2oGray/2oSheet/36/o31/ol36031ooo/o8O2lo fdafccmou.pdf.
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delay the progress of wireless medical technology." The 2012 Food and Drug Ad-
ministration Safety Innovation Act included a requirement that the FDA, FCC,
and the Office of the National Coordinator in the White House publish a "pro-
posed strategy and recommendations on an appropriate, risk-based regulatory
framework pertaining to health information technology, including mobile med-
ical applications, that promotes innovation, protects patient safety, and avoids
regulatory duplication.""
E. Targeting Expertise to Accelerate and Improve Device Review
New expertise platforms offer the promise of decreasing the cost of express-
ing and finding expertise, including better ways for assessing the identification of
expertise, understood broadly to go beyond degrees received; searching for and
finding relevant experts across multiple disciplines and institutions beyond those
locally known to the searcher; and matching expertise to a hard problem (such
as the steps involved in regulatory practices) with real-world consequences.
Sourcing expertise in highly technical fields where relevant expertise can also
be found among academics and regulators, two populations who maintain data
about their qualifications, is a natural first foray into expert networking. Aca-
demics regularly maintain data about their credentials and publications. The
norms of the profession require sharing such information openly, and databases
are already prevalent in the biomedical sciences than in other domains. Regula-
tors are far less transparent about their credentials, but more so about their ex-
perience, at least internally. There is a record of which regulator worked on which
regulatory action. In short, these are two groups about which data exists to aid in
automating requests to participate.
There is no shortage of knowledgeable people in the biomedical sciences. In
addition to the 8oo scientists at CDRH, approximately 14,000 people work at the
wider FDA, and another 6ooo scientists work at the National Institutes of
Health (NIH)." There are over 83,oo employees at NIH's parent agency, HHS,
24. Letter from Marsha Blackburn et al., Members, U.S. Cong., to Margaret Hamburg,
Comm'r, U.S. Food s Drug Admin. & Julius Genachowski, Chairman, U.S. Fed.
Commc'ns. Comm'n (Apr. 3, 2012), http://blackburn.house.gov/uploadedfiles/let-
terfromcongress-to-fda-and-fcc-J3apr20l2.pdf; see Letter from Bradley Mer-
rill Thompson, Member, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., to U.S. Food & Drug Ad-
min. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wpcontent/
uploads/20o0/o6/MRC-Comment-Letter-on-UDI-Proposal-10112012.pdf.
25. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No 112-144,
§ 618, 126 Stat. 993, io63 (2012).
26. See Distribution of Full-Time Equivalent Employment Program Level, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManuals
Forms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM301553.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
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not to mention the hundreds of thousands of biomedical professionals working
in industry and academia." While the FDA has a Medical Devices Advisory Com-
mittee comprising eighteen panels of medical practitioners and industry experts
representing consumer and industry interests, 9 the FDA has no way to quickly
discover enough diverse individuals who possess relevant expertise to review ap-
plications. The FDA also needs to find private sector participants who might have
deeper knowledge of an innovation. In order to enhance its research and regula-
tory activities and accelerate its review, the FDA needs to find internal experts to
advise regulatory review panels. Subsequently, it also needs external experts to
participate in review panels and educate the agency about new trends in medical
devices, such as identifying the therapeutic benefits of 3D printing or nanotech.
IV. THE EXPERIMENT: OPENING REGULATORY REVIEW WITH FDA PROFILES
Enter FDA Profiles. OSEL is launching this "Research Networking" software
pilot under the leadership of one of FDA's new "Entrepreneurs in Residence"-
outside experts invited to do a stint in public service to inject innovative ideas
and insights into government. These Entrepreneurs in Residence were given the
mission of helping CDRH transform and accelerate the device-approval process.
The original project lead was Anjali Kataria, who headed the Health Information
and Decision Systems Program at the University of Maryland's business school
and who was asked to bring this experience to bear in implementing the Profiles
project at the FDA.
Although unique in government, FDA Profiles is not revolutionary; it does
not seek to upset the apple cart of power and change who makes the ultimate
decisions at the FDA about devices. To the contrary, the project's ultimate goal
is to inform regulators about relevant experts more quickly. FDA Profiles uses
the Harvard Profiles Research Networking Software (RNS) platform, developed
by Harvard Medical School with support from the NIH. The platform is in use at
240 institutions, including Harvard, Penn State, Boston University, the Univer-
sity of California - San Francisco (UCSF) and more.30 Profiles is an open-source
expert discovery and networking tool that helps to find researchers with specific
areas of expertise. "Profiles RNS imports and analyzes'white pages' information,
publications, and other data sources to create and maintain a complete searcha-
ble library of web-based electronic CV's."3'
28. See 2on Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. 4 (2011), http://www.hhs.gov/about/sustainability/2011plan-summary
.pdf.
29. See Advisory Committees, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/MedicalDevices/
MedicalDevicesAdvisoryCommitteel (last updated Nov. 14, 2012).
30. See Open Source Community, HARVARD CATALYST, http://profiles.catalyst.
harvard.edu/?pg=community (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
31. See id.
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The FDA Profiles pilot project is slated to launch in 2014 and create a search-
able online expert directory, initially of FDA staff and then of outside scientists,
using both internal FDA data such as personnel data and external data sources
such as publications from PubMed and Web of Science. The goal of the first
phase of the project is to test the speed and efficacy of using networking tools to
improve collaboration between internal FDA scientists and regulators. Eventu-
ally, the goal is to enhance collaboration between government regulators and ac-
ademia to improve the understanding of the complex science needed to make
hard policy decisions. 2
V. How PROFILES MEASURES EXPERTISE
Harvard Catalyst Profiles measures expertise through a combination of pas-
sive and active means. In a form of passive networking, its expertise algorithms
are designed to automatically add data from online publication sources to a per-
son's Profiles bio and then to analyze this data to build a catalog of people's ex-
pertise and their research networks.33 Passive networks are automatically created
based on current or past co-authorship history, organizational relationships, and
geographic proximity. Profiles can auto-populate a profile by scraping from
online biographies, professional society memberships, education and training
records, affiliations, regulatory accomplishments, publications from open data-
bases, and grants from grants.gov.
In addition, in a form of active networking, a researcher can also manually
add data about their interests, skills, and projects or specify their relationships
with an advisor, mentor, or other people, "expand[ing Profiles] content with in-
formation about social networks that only they know."3 4 With the combination
of passively gleaned and actively contributed data, Harvard Catalyst Profiles
speeds the process of locating the "right" experts by algorithmically matching
people to opportunities to participate.
The organizing framework for all this data-whether scraped from databases
or manually inputted-is borrowed from VIVO, another open-source expert dis-
covery initiative. VIVO is a multi-university collaboration that represents au-
thoritative data about researchers. "When installed and populated with re-
searcher interests, activities, and accomplishments, [VIVO] enables the discovery
32. Telephone Interview with Jessica N. Hernandez, FDA Profiles Team Member (Mar.
31,2014).
33. See Anjali Kataria, Food & Drug Admin. Entrepreneur in Residence, and Jessica N.
Hernandez, Program Analyst, Office of Sci. and Eng'g Laboratories, Food & Drug
Admin., Presentation on the OSEL Research Networking Software Pilot (Oct. i,
2013).
34. Professional Networking and Expertise Mining for Research Collaboration, HARVARD
CATALYST, http://profiles.catalyst.harvard.edu/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
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of research and scholarship across disciplines at that institution and beyond.
VIVO supports browsing and a search function, which returns faceted results for
rapid retrieval of desired information." 6
VIVO working groups have developed an ontology" 7-on which Harvard
and FDA Profiles rely-for describing a researcher and her expertise. The ontol-
ogy provides the organizing categories and common definitions for describing
research fields, research projects, datasets used, teaching experience and, of
course, fields of expertise. The Profiles tools use the VIVO ontology.
Profiles is designed to combine techniques of passive networking and active
networking. From both of these sources, Profiles generates a set of prioritized
keywords-the Concept Cloud-to define a researcher's interests over time.38
People will be able to add their own skills and edit their own profiles. The
Profiles platform uses an algorithm to return relevant search results in a list and
in various visual graphs showing relationships between people. Type in "stent,"
and FDA Profiles will list people at the FDA with explanations of why they were
suggested in order to provide information that is useful in obtaining a technical
consultation for a regulatory review in its first phase. Although Profiles will ini-
tially function as a kind of FDA/HHS Facebook, the plan is to connect with other
networks like VIVO to find expertise outside the agency. In the future, there are
plans to incorporate patents, as well as data from Linkedln, SlideShare, and other
social media, into FDA Profiles. There are also plans to integrate collaboration
software with the people-search capacities of Profiles. Once one finds relevant
experts, it is important to be able to communicate and collaborate with them.
UCSF, for example, is experimenting with "Open Proposals," a crowdsourcing
site designed to engender pre-competitive collaboration among academics. It is
generating robust and productive engagement.39
VI. DOES TARGETING EXPERTISE WORK? TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS WITH CON-
TROLLED TRIALS
Whether left or right, governance practices often seem designed, as New York
Times columnist David Brooks once said, by "people hermetically sealed in the
house of government." 40 We have policy walls in place that limit experimentation
and diversity in policymaking practices. Software entrepreneur and political
commentator Jim Manzi writes in Uncontrolled: The Surprising Payoff of Trial-
36. About, VIVO, http://www.vivoweb.org/about (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
37. See Semantic Modeling of Scientist: The VIVO Ontology, VIVO, http://vivoweb.org/
files/SemanticModeling.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
38. See About Harvard Catalyst Profiles, HARVARD CATALYST, http://connects.
catalyst.harvard.edu/Profiles/about/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
39. See About UCSF Open Proposals, UCSF OPEN PROPOSALS, https://open-pro-
posals.ucsf.edu/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
40. David Brooks, The Progressive Shift, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2013, http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/opinion/brooks-the-progressive-shift.html.
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and-Error for Business, Politics and Society, his paean to the importance of the
scientific method, that we lack the opportunity in policymaking "to experiment
and discover workable arrangements through an open-ended process of trial and
error." 41 It is inexcusable, he laments, that we make macroeconomic decisions
with global consequences with no means to know what works and why. He argues
for freedom to experiment with different regulatory rule-sets at the most local
level. This Jeffersonian brand of federalism is an intuitively appealing way to test
what works. Although typically advocated by those on the right, critics like com-
munications scholar Jonathan Taplin have also been articulating a federalist vi-
sion from the left.42
David Halpern, Senior Advisor to several recent British Prime Ministers,
fought to establish a Social and Behavioural Insights (or "Nudge") Unit in the
Cabinet Office to advise the government on the use of randomized-controlled
trials (RCTs) in policymaking in Britain. Randomized-control trials are used in
medicine, business, and other fields to test effectiveness by comparing the out-
comes of an intervention against a randomly selected group that does not receive
the intervention. They are an inexpensive way to know what works when and
where.43 In a randomized control trial, the target population is divided at random
into two groups, with different interventions applied to each. As noted earlier,
what is standard practice among companies testing drugs or the design of a web-
site is almost unknown in public policy where a mindset that the professionals
know best still prevails.
What these social and behavioral experiments in government do not do, at
least to date, is to experiment with approaches to making policy by comparing
outcomes that result with and without different forms of public engagement.
Choosing to vary where and how we restrict abortion or legalize prostitution and
whether we make decisions at the federal or state level still fails to question un-
derlying assumptions about who makes policy and how we make it on these is-
sues in the first place. Brandeis's laboratories of democracy44 might cook up dif-
ferent policy prescriptions but with the same institutional beakers and burners
we have always used. There is simply no experience within government of making
governing professionals themselves, as well as the way they work, the object of
careful experimentation.
Now imagine if randomized controlled trials had been used with the Aristo-
tle program. A person trying to solve a problem could have tried to find experts
41. JIM MANZI, UNCONTROLLED: THE SURPRISING PAYOFF OF TRIAL-AND-ERROR FOR
BUSINESS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY xii (2012).
42. See Jon Taplin, New Federalism Revisited, JON TAPLIN'S BLOG (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://jontaplin.com/2011/O9/21/new-federalism-revisited/.
43. See Laura Haynes et al., Test, Learn, Adapt: Developing Public Policy with Random-
ised Controlled Trials, CABINET OFFICE BEHAV. INSIGHTS TEAM (2012), https://www
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/62529/TLA
-1906126.pdf.
44. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandies, J., dissenting).
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using traditional methods such as querying their own rolodex, and compared
their results against using Aristotle to find experts. They then could have repeated
this test many times. The DOD could have run similar tests, comparing the use
of LinkedIn against the use of its internal system. Observing the differences could
have yielded real insight. Imagine if half the target population at the DOD had
their information automatically uploaded, and the other half was asked to fill out
a form. It would be easy to compare results and see which approach yielded more
useful profiles. Imagine if, when asking people to fill out the form, some people
had been asked to share their credentials and others asked to say something about
their skills. Who would be more likely to participate? And who, when later con-
tacted with a request, would be more likely to answer? We will never know.
We are witnessing new strategies for combining human with machine intel-
ligence45 to organize knowledge. But there is still surprisingly little research on
how complex organizations actually make decisions and solve problems using
crowdsourcing and almost nothing on how they might combine crowdsourcing,
with expert discovery. There is almost no empirical testing of alternatives in real-
world contexts. White House innovation expert Tom Kalil is fond of saying that
the Department of Education gives away two-thirds of its budget in grants and
loans for education, but none of that money goes to experiment with learning
how to create a Department of Education that works better.
The FDA Profiles project offers an early opportunity to gather empirical ev-
idence about whether targeting expertise helps the agency overcome the chal-
lenges I have identified, including the agility deficit and the expertise deficit, and
does so despite budgetary challenges. The agency itself, together with collabora-
tors at UCSF, drafted a research proposal for studying whether "the new tools
and processes to enable discovery of experts and their networks and facilitate
conversations online might change how easily and fluidly a regulator such as the
FDA and its community of experts might interact with academic scientists."46
The hypothesis, naturally, is that these tools will enable the kind of expertise shar-
ing that is useful and relevant to the regulatory process.
As we test the efficacy of this innovation for improving how we make policy,
we can advance our own understanding of whether targeting helps to increase
intelligence in the system and of how institutions get smarter. FDA Profiles af-
fords a chance to study the impact of expert networking on crowdsourcing more
generally. But this will require introducing testing (including randomized con-
trolled trials), such as comparing a general call to advise or participate in a regu-
latory review panel against attracting participation using Profiles. Doing so will
advance our understanding of how to introduce approaches to policymaking that
are both empirically validated and agile in design.
45. For more on the advances resulting from the combination of human and machine
intelligence today, see CLIVE THOMPSON, SMARTER THAN You THINK: How
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING OUR MINDS FOR THE BETTER (2013).
46. Telephone Interview with Anjali Kataria and Jessica N. Hernandez, FDA Profiles
Team Members (Aug. 8, 2013).
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Introducing empirical research into FDA Profiles is a chance to experiment
not simply with policies but also with the policymaking process. Even without
changes to the current design of the FDA Profiles project, it would be possible to
compare outcomes between regulatory review panels recruited and run with and
without targeting. So, for example, even within the target populations of FDA or
HHS personnel or biomedical academics that the profiles team will seek to up-
load into its database, it would be possible to compare targeting participation
with Profiles against status quo methods to understand the impact of sorting by
academic degree and publication. Does targeting on the basis of academic cre-
dentials have the downside of reaching those who are too busy to help and the
whose professional norms discourage such volunteer activity?
Even more learning becomes possible if the project is adapted to build in
opportunity for experimentation. After comparing the use of Profiles against its
absence, experimenters could run parallel trials with tweaks to the algorithm. If
first we want to test the impact of targeting, next we ought to test different ways
of targeting.
For example, we might be able to sort people based on their degrees or their
publication record but not both. We might also ask people to complete a ques-
tionnaire to assess their skills and experience, enabling a comparison between
targeting based on skills and credentials and publications. We could take the
same population in the Profiles database-a known and circumscribed group-
and create new databases about their expertise by scraping data about them from
other sources, such as Linkedln, Facebook, and Wikipedia. We want to under-
stand the impact of targeting based on traditional academic criteria, but good
academics might turn out to be bad participants because they are trained to con-
tribute in ways that are unhelpful to regulators (for example, academics used to
writing long articles are often the least useful to busy government professionals).
But testing a variety of criteria for selection should be a part of the rollout plan.
There is direct precedent for experimentation "in the wild" in institutional
innovation, including using expert networking, in the experiments run by Pro-
fessor Karim Lakhani and his colleagues. Lakhani, an expert in open-innovation
practices, studied the impact of open innovation from the Harvard Catalyst pro-
ject on diabetes research.47 Harvard Catalyst is a "pan university clinical transla-
tional science center"48 situated at Harvard Medical School exploring the ques-
tion of how to rethink all aspects of the scientific-research process. To the end of
solving "high-risk, high impact problems in human health-related research,"4 9
Catalyst takes each aspect of the research process and designs a strategy for open-
ing it up to more information and input from a wider audience. The goal is to
bring in fresh ideas and novel perspectives.
47. Eva Guinan, Kevin J. Boudreau & Karim R. Lakhani, Experiments in Open Innova-
tion at Harvard Medical School, 54 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 45 (2013).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 46.
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In 2010, Catalyst undertook an experiment to open up how universities gen-
erate research questions.50 Typically, an academic decides on the direction for his
or her lab. In an effort to generate new ideas from unlikely sources for promising
approaches to fighting Type 1 diabetes before investing research funding, Catalyst
sponsored a $30,000 prize-backed challenge. The Catalyst challenge was unique
because it didn't ask people to come up with answers as is typically the case in
crowdsourcing projects. Rather, contributors supplied the questions. This ena-
bled people to suggest ideas regardless of whether they had the resources to solve
the problem they proposed. After six weeks, 150 research hypotheses were sub-
mitted, encompassing a broad range of approaches from different disciplines.
The authors analyzed the subject matter of the submissions and found that they
were "quite different from what existed in the literature and from the existing
body of ideas under investigation within the Type 1 Diabetes research commu-
nity." The Leona Helmsley Trust put up one million dollars in grant funding at
Harvard to encourage scientists to launch experiments based on these newly gen-
erated research questions.
In addition to normal advertising of the grant opportunity, Harvard Catalyst
used Profiles to identify researchers whose record indicated that they might be
particularly well suited to submit proposals. The Profiles system takes the Pub-
Med-listed publications for all Harvard Medical School faculty members and cre-
ates a database of expertise based on a classification of their published papers.
The topics of the experimental design proposals were matched to these classifi-
cations. "The intention was to move beyond the established diabetes research
community and discover researchers who had done work related to specific
themes present in the new research hypotheses but not necessarily in diabetes."52
In the end, the matching algorithm yielded over one thousand scientists who
potentially had the knowledge needed to create research proposals for these new
hypotheses. Harvard Catalyst then emailed these faculty members and an-
nounced the new funding opportunity. As in the public sector, this kind of tar-
geted outreach is not common in biomedical research.
The outreach resulted in thirty-one Harvard faculty-led teams competing for
funding, of whom twenty-three had been identified using Profiles. Of those, four-
teen had no significant prior involvement in Type i diabetes research. In the end,
seven proposals were funded with five of the lead investigators having not done
any prior work in Type 1 diabetes. It is too soon to know the impact of this ex-
periment for sufferers of the disease. Typical timelines for medical innovations
50. Congratulations to the Winners of the First Harvard Catalyst/InnoCentive Ideation
Challenge: "What Do We Not Know to Cure Type i Diabetes?," HARVARD CATALYST
(Sept. 29, 2010), http://catalyst.harvard.edu/news/news.html?p=1966.
51. Beth Simone Noveck, Innovating the Innovation Process: Re-imagining University
Research, GovLAB BLOG (June 5, 2013), http://thegovlab.org/innovating-the
-innovation-process-re- imagining-university-research/ (quoting interview with
Karim Lakhani).
52. Guinan et al., supra note 47, at 50.
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translating from bench to bedside are fifteen to thirty years. But the experiment
did yield some exciting results:
The core insight driving Harvard Catalyst's experiments was that all
stages of the previously narrow and fully integrated innovation system-
from hypothesis generation to idea selection to execution-can be dis-
aggregated, separated and opened to outside input. By opening up par-
ticipation to nontraditional actors, Harvard Catalyst achieved its objec-
tives of bringing in truly novel perspectives, ideas and people into an
established area of research."
To understand whether smarter governance improves the effectiveness and
legitimacy of decisionmaking at the FDA, FDA Profiles-as the first major Ex-
pertNet initiative-could and should be transformed into a research experiment.
Doing so would pave the way for more such research on institutional innovation.
This could help the policy and research community study strategies for identify-
ing and matching expertise; defining and framing the call; creating incentives to
participate; and developing institutional readiness.
VII. IDENTIFYING AND MATCHING EXPERTISE: WHO PARTICIPATES
FDA Profiles has its own algorithms for identifying potential experts within
the FDA and outside of it. By mining grants, publications, and bio-sketches, the
Profiles approach differs significantly from previous procedures. In light of this
fact, Profiles may enable us to explore a new set of questions, including how we
can best identify expertise and whether these new approaches worked better or
worse as means of encouraging quality participation. As of now, several im-
portant questions remain unanswered. There is no guarantee, for example, that
targeting based on credentials will yield the "right" community of participants.
In fact, the whole problem is that we don't know up front who and what we don't
know. The success of crowdsourcing and open innovation is that these practices
attract unexpected participants. In the Harvard Catalyst case, the search they did
was broad, resulting in a thousand potential candidates, many of whom had no
direct training in diabetes research.
Similarly, in the FDA context, we can and should try to search narrowly and
broadly and see what results. Empirical experiment opportunities can provide
answers to questions, such as:
* How does Profiles identify who knows what?
* How does Profiles target requests to participate and "match"
people to opportunities?
* Who participated more readily and more usefully? In other
words, are those with the know-how that Profiles defines as ex-
pertise more or less likely to participate and are they more or
less likely to participate in ways that are helpful and relevant to
53. Id. at 47-48.
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regulators? This can be answered using randomized control tri-
als to compare results against putting out a general inquiry or
using a different platform, which quantifies expertise differ-
ently.
* How useful are these techniques for surfacing diverse experts?
In other words, it might be simple to find people who work on
heart stents but how do I match a materials scientist who works
in another domain but might have relevant insights to share?
The FDA needs expertise at different stages of decision making, from identi-
fying emerging trends such as 3D printing to reviewing a specific device such as
a new stent. FDA Profiles affords a chance to study whether expert networking
and targeting participation by those with specific kinds of expertise works better
at different stages. Are these techniques more useful for staffing review panels or
getting insights about next-generation devices or other policymaking activities?
It would be advisable to introduce a control in the process, such as putting out
general calls to participate via social media or the Federal Register and contrast
with using Profiles. In addition, comparisons can be run by inviting different
groups of people to participate in review panels, including those that Profiles
scored as most and least relevant in a search.
VIII. INCENTIVES AND MOTIVATION: IF WE BUILD IT, WILL THEY COME AND
WILL THEY STAY?
"People are drawn to participate because some psychological, social, or emo-
tional need is being met. And when the need isn't met, they don't participate,"
writes Crowdsourcing author Jeff Howe. 4 FDA Profiles is an opportunity to ex-
periment with incentives for engagement in policymaking empirically, using the
behavioral insights we have from other fields about why people sign up and what
causes them to participate.
The FDA Profiles pilot will begin by searching only scientists internal to the
FDA to perform technical consultations. Presumably, the rates of participation
will be high as people are being asked to do something consistent with their job
requirements and performance. In fact, they might be required to participate. But
what happens when Profiles rolls out to the broader agency and the wider world?
Before the roll out, it will be important to design the research protocols to apply
to the experiment and test what incentives cause people to share their knowledge
and expertise.
FDA Profiles is an instance where the rewards for engagement are intrinsic.
Intrinsic rewards include such things as autonomy or the degree of freedom and
563
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creativity allowed by the task;" being part of a community;"6 learning during the
process of contributing;" and altruism.'" For example, "tight engagement with
the community was critical to the success of knowledge sharing within the Stack
Overflow community." 9 Wikipedia participants responded that contributing in
and of itself created a sense of satisfaction."o When asked why they contribute to
Wikipedia, respondents said to educate humanity and raise awareness (48.9%);
the feeling of making a difference (17.78%); and to give back to the Wikipedia
community (15-56%). This is not uncommon: 53% of developers surveyed were
influenced by social motivations such as learning, sharing knowledge, participat-
ing in new forms of cooperation, and participating in the open source commu-
nity.61
By contrast, the motivation to say "yes" and join and then to participate is
sometimes impelled by extrinsic considerations, such as monetary reward or
gains in reputation or recognition. For example, Stack Overflow keeps track of
users' participation by awarding points, which in turn are used as a measure of
reputation in the community. But much of the literature on online Q&A sites, for
example, suggests that while monetary incentives such as prizes might be relevant
to entice people to start participating, social incentives, such as social interaction
with contributors, lead to continuing participation."
Here we have the chance to deepen our understanding of how different
groups respond to diverse incentives. Do they respond to the compelling nature
of the call or the opportunity to participate consistent with their expertise and
know-how? Does the framing of the challenge matter more than how participa-
tion is structured and organized? Do people behave differently when a formal
prize is offered as opposed to a free t-shirt or implicit gratification? How do com-
petition and a leaderboard showing the most frequent or helpful panelists impact
engagement?
55. Nicolas Kaufmann et al., More Than Fun and Money. Worker Motivation in
Crowdsourcing - A Study on Mechanical Turk (2011), http://www.researchgate.net/
publication/22o894276_More than funandmoney._WorkerMotivation in
Crowdsourcing_-_AStudy on-MechanicalTurk/file/9fcfd5oe5afeoo7d78.pdf.
56. Stacey Kuznetsov, Motivations of Contributors to Wikipedia, ACM SIGCAS
COMPUTERS & Soc'Y NEWSL., June 2006, at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Lena Mamykina et al., Design Lessons frorn the Fastest Q&A Site in the West, 2011
PROC. SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 2857, 2865.
60. Kuznetsov, supra note 56, at 3.
61. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, Understanding Free Software Developers: Findings from the
FLOSS Study, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOFTWARE 23, 35 (Joseph Feller et
al. eds., 2005).
62. See Mamykina et al., supra note 59.
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In addition to assessing whether the nature of the reward causes or depresses
participation, we want to look at how people behave when the incentives change.
In one study of the use of badges on Stack Overflow, the authors found that cer-
tain users will essentially game the system-altering their behavior in order to
maximize their potential to receive badges. This raises the question of whether
and in what circumstances badge systems necessarily encourage high-quality
contributions.63 In another study of human motivation on social networks, the
design of the interface and whether it publicly displayed user performance corre-
lated positively with the volume of participation.4
FDA Profiles is an early chance to understand for the public sector:
* What are the extrinsic (rewards, points, badges, prizes) and in-
trinsic (altruism, autonomy, curiosity, empathy) motivations
for participation, and how do they compare within the context
of solving societal problems?
* How can a single call for participation cater to the heterogene-
ous motivations that may be necessary to engage the optimal
variety of experts?
* Are there certain types of incentive structures that are better
able to create a community of expert problem-solvers?
* How can institutions ensure that participants feel as though
they are legitimate, albeit peripheral, participants in the inno-
vation process, rather than free labor whose input can be
thoughtlessly accepted or rejected?
* How can institutions ensure that citizens' input and efforts are
useful within the segment of the population where open inno-
vation's greatest incentive is the ability to self-select and choose
what problems to work on and how?
Also, we want to understand when using expert networking and people
search tools to target expertise offers a more cost-effective substitute or perhaps
a complement to prizes. Prizes help to coax experts out of a broader population.
With expert networking, perhaps prizes become superfluous. We want to explore
through experimentation how they can be combined in ways that solve problems
and build a useful directory of people available to solve problems over time.
63. Ashton Anderson et al., Steering User Behavior With Badges, 22 PROC. INT'L CONF.
WORLD WIDE WEB 95 (2013).
64. Al M. Rashid et al., Motivating Participation by Displaying the Value of Contribution,
20o6 PROC. SIGCHI CONF. HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS. 955.
565
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
IX. READINESS AND IMPEDIMENTS
Designing a citizen-engagement program that yields results needs to focus
on the motivation of the consulting institution as well as individual participants.
Even if the agency can match experts, frame the problem, and create meaningful
incentives to participate, it still has to be ready and able to use the know-how they
contribute. This is where there is a dearth of research. How the expertise gets used
offers another avenue for exploration, especially as there exists an opportunity to
adjust how people engage consistent with statutory limitations. The effectiveness
of targeting has to be measured in the context, for example, of whether the regu-
latory review panel meets online or offline, how often and under what rule sys-
tem. For example, if the expertise being sought is requested online, there is a
learning curve with new members that can impact the conversations taking place,
as new people get up to speed. Users bring experience from other interactions to
new platforms. An earlier study found that a user's outlook, moderation behav-
ior, and replies to comments are key in continued participation. Variables affect-
ing participation outcomes include previous experience, observation, and feed-
back.6" In other words, experience with participation online, as opposed to
subject matter expertise, might ultimately correlate better with performance. The
way the agency uses the advice has to be considered when weighing how to use
expertise.
The FDA experience with FDA Profiles will provide insight into the impedi-
ments that prevented the agency from making use of participant expertise. Did it
face legal or cultural barriers when rolling out the project or using the input re-
ceived? Others will be eager to know. How did it use the input? Who had to give
permission or acquiesce to the adoption of the project? How were agency officials
affected? What was their own view of the usefulness of the engagement?
When the need is identifying people to serve on regulatory approval panels,
to review grants, or to serve on advisory committees, it is easy to imagine that the
institution will find it easy to make use of a searchable directory of candidates to
fill these pre-defined roles and answer clearly articulated regulatory questions.
We have yet to confirm if this is true. Further research will also have to be under-
taken to learn whether these techniques work just as well when the goals are dif-
ferent. For example, organizations often need quick access to missing facts from
those likely to have them. At other times, however, the need is for diverse view-
points from a wide array of sources. Often the need is for input from people be-
longing to specific groups, whether stakeholders or experts, in order to ensure
the legitimacy of decisionmaking. We are only at the beginning of testing when
and in which circumstances targeting expertise helps.
Assessment of FDA Profiles should pay close attention to the impact of
providing certain experts with greater access and influence to how we govern.
65. Cliff Lampe & Erik Johnston, Follow the (Slash) Dot: Effects of Feedback on New
Members in an Online Community, 2005 PROC. INT'L ACM SIGGROUP CONF. ON
SUPPORTING GROUP WORK 11, ii.
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CONCLUSION
In the context of device review, grant review, and other domains where ex-
pertise is clearly called for, it would seem that using expert networking platforms
can only democratize what are currently fairly closed processes. Whether or not
it will privilege a new audience, however, remains to be seen. It is still an open
question how to use the same smarter governance tools and techniques in con-
nection with more value-based rather than fact-based decisions.
CDRH is primed and eager for this project, and has a clear idea of the kind
of expertise that is needed. But it needs to embrace experimentation as part of
the process if we are to learn with any certainty how Profiles worked and whether
it worked well enough to merit continued investment. The ExpertNet project of-
fers the opportunity to test empirically whether segmenting and targeting the au-
dience helps to improve participation.
The role of the regulator is fraught. Regulatory agencies are frequently under
siege from industry groups who bemoan burdensome and costly requirements as
impeding economic growth and the progress of innovation. At the same time,
consumer groups assault them for failing to prioritize the public interest and pro-
tect citizens from dangerous and fraudulent products and services. Both sides
challenge their ability to impose requirements, questioning whether authority
has been properly delegated to them and whether their practices are legitimate.
Both sides complain about a lack of effectiveness and inefficiency in how they
work. The FDA has long come under heavy attack for failing to do its job well.
Traditionally, the approach to fixing the problem has been sought in Con-
gress. Industry and consumer groups seek legislation to clarify the rules and re-
quirements and impose procedures favorable to their point of view. The new law,
in turn, delegates to the agency the power to make regulations pursuant to ad-
ministrative law developed in the 1940S with limited opportunities for public
consultation. We make these decisions in the same way we always have, making
the legislative battlefield the place where disputes play out. No data is shared, and
decisionmaking is done behind closed doors in order to protect corporate secrecy
and safeguard the integrity of the process.
New technology has opened up new possibilities for changing how we make
decisions that could improve both the effectiveness and legitimacy of how we
regulate. The FDA Profiles pilot is also a radical experiment. It changes the de-
fault on how the agency makes decisions by bringing in diverse expertise at the
outset (and has the potential to do more once it begins to get used outside the
FDA). The hope is that, by finding the right experts and matching them to op-
portunities to participate, they can inform the work of the agency and lead to the
making of better decisions faster. It remains to be seen whether opening up how
the agency works will transform the effectiveness, legitimacy, and impact of the
FDA's work.
But the FDA's willingness to experiment with projects like FDA Profiles po-
tentially heralds a sea change in terms of a receptivity to expert networking and,
perhaps more importantly, to empirical research to drive institutional innova-
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tion. When social-science research is integrated with the practice of policymak-
ing, we gain insight into the resulting impact on decisionmaking and people's
lives. We can then apply what we learn to the broader goal of improving govern-
ance.
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